Abstract

This article posits the Tangkhul Naga idea of yoyāri as a concept of well-being, living well, akin to the concepts of buen vivir or vivir bien in Spanish, sumak kawsay in Quechua and suma gamaña/qamaña in Aymara. Firstly, it explores the etymology of yoyāri. It then investigates the Tangkhul Naga mind and self. Then, it attempts to foreground how yoyāri is lived, realised and embodied by investigating the philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei (etiquette, mannerism, civic sense and behavioural expression of agency) and chānhān lāhān khaung (speech etiquette). Then, it explains how the paradoxes of reality and existence and the relational causalities of the two are navigated and negotiated. A short comment on hermeneutical dissonances follows in the conclusion.

Keywords: Yoyāri, buen vivir, vivir bien, sumak kawsay, suma gamaña/qamaña, eudaimonia, well-being, living well, hermeneutical dissonances.

 

Introduction

The concept of well-being has had a long history in the aspiration of human emancipation and flourishing. The Greek concept of eudaimonia[i] is widely understood as well-being, living well, which, according to Aristotle, is the ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete [virtue]’ (Aristotle, 2004: 12). Roger Crisp uses ‘human good’ in place of eudaimonia in his translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:

[T]hen if this is so, the human good [read as Eudaimonia] turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete [virtue]. Again, this must be over a complete life. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor one day. Neither does one day or a short time make someone blessed and happy (Aristotle, 2004: 12, 1098a, italics mine).

Well-being, in the sense of Aristotle as the ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete [virtue]’, is a deep conceptualisation. However, human good seems to have overshot a bit, creating a dissonance between the concept and the translated or interpreted meaning. As cognitive dissonances beget psychological tension, stress and discomfort, hermeneutical dissonances as such also beget dissonances in meaning, meaning-making, knowledge production and other unintended consequences.

Taking cognisance of such issues, if prevalent today, and to contribute to the extension of the epistemology and philosophy of well-being, this article posits the Tangkhul Naga idea of yoyāri as one of the philosophical concepts of well-being, living well. This is an attempt at the extension of the Indigenous scholarship of well-being, such as buen vivir or vivir bien in Spanish, sumak kawsay in Quechua, or suma gamaña in Aymara (Munck, 2024); suma qamaña (Gudynas, 2011 uses this spelling) and/or grounding them deeper. Buen Vivir or Vivir Bien is broadly defined as ‘living well in social solidarity and harmony with nature’ (Veltmeyer & Záyago-Lau, 2021; Petras, 2021; Wise, 2021). ‘The growing consensus ended in the incorporation of the ideas of Buen Vivir in the new Constitution of Ecuador (approved in 2008) and Bolivia (approved in 2009)’ (Gudynas, 2011: 442). The idea of yoyāri attempts to give a philosophical foundation to the Indigenous conceptions of well-being from a Tangkhul Naga perspective.

More than positing the idea of yoyāri as a concept of well-being with qualifications and disqualifications, this article foregrounds the Tangkhul Naga philosophical praxes[ii] of actualising and living the well-being, living well; how well-being is lived? How is life lived well in a communitarian pre-state village republic of the pre-Colonial Tangkhul Nagas? Several communitarian pre-state village republics constitute the pre-Colonial Tangkhul Nagas, one of the kindred Naga communities. Tangkhul Nagas inhabit the Ukhrul and Kamjong Districts, and partially in Tengnoupal, Senapati and Thoubal Districts, Manipur in India, and Leishi Township and Homalin Township in Myanmar. Tangkhul Naga Tui (language) is classified as ‘a Tibeto-Burman branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family’ (Vashum, 2014: 11). This article, more than elaborating what yoyāri is, explains how yoyāri is lived, realised and embodied. Note here that the social, cultural, political and epistemic location of this article is the pre-Colonial Tangkhul Nagas, when the Tangkhul Nagas had not been proselytised nor exposed to Western education and other forms of colonial intrusions during the ‘partial’ British colonial period and traumatically marginalised during the Indian ‘occupation[iii]’ period.

While the idea of yoyāri is relatively easier imagined in and of its beauty in a Platonic sense, the challenge lies in realising, living and embodying it. This article investigates and explains how Tangkhul Nagas navigate and negotiate with the paradoxes of reality and existence and the relational causalities of the two: it explains how the idea of yoyāri is lived, realised and embodied. Tangkhul Nagas do so in two ways, which are articulated and conceptualised here for easier understanding as the philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung, though a sharp delineation as such is absent in reality or Tangkhul Naga lifeworld.

Simply put, the philosophical praxis of achei arei kathei is the Tangkhul Naga philosophical praxis of etiquette, mannerism, civic sense and behavioural expression of agency. And the philosophical praxis of chānhān lāhān khaung is the Tangkhul Naga philosophical praxis of revered speech etiquette. These two philosophical praxes are intricately linked and complementary to each other. It is enabled by an equanimous cognitive and emotive state of mind and self in circularity or in a continuum, which Bodhi (2020, 2022) called an ‘equanimity-compassion continuum’. The enactment and embodiment of these two philosophical praxes help understand, navigate and negotiate with the paradoxes of reality and existence and the relational causalities of the two without disrupting the equilibrial homeostasis or within the tolerance level and/or the threshold of regeneration capacity: In other words, within a/the permissible paradigm of a social-natural contract; permissible in the sense of justness and equity in a social contract, and permissible in the sense of regeneration capacity and sustainability in a natural contract.

This article is structured as follows. The second section explores the etymology of yoyāri. Thirdly, it investigates the Tangkhul Naga mind and self. Fourthly, it examines the philosophical praxis of achei arei kathei. Fifthly, it enquires into the philosophical praxis of chānhān lāhān khaung. Sixthly, it explains how the philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung help understand, navigate and negotiate with the paradoxes of reality and existence and the relational causalities of the two. Lastly, a short conclusion follows.

Etymology of Yoyāri

Yoyāri is a word used less frequently today in everyday conversation, though names of persons are more common than rare. It is found in one of the folk songs recorded in T. Luikham’s work (2013: 188). The word yoyāri does not surface in any of the Tangkhul Naga dictionaries known to the public hitherto. It is also not mentioned in Luikham’s dictionary (1974), one of the popular ones, but as a synonym of nongsairi, which is translated into English as “slowly, no hesitately [sic], nobly”. It may be paraphrased as ‘slowly, not hesitantly but nobly’: this could also be interpreted as ‘poisedly without hesitation or fear but nobly’. It also reflects the ‘self-contained world’ that Kapai posits (2017: 46) and the ‘self-contained economics’ that Hutton (1965: 19) posits: The security of their ‘self-contained world’ with ‘self-contained economics’ gives the ‘slowly, not hesitantly, nobly’ demeanour, mindset, attitudinal ethos (in the sense of Foucault), and vice versa.

Morphologically, yoyāri is a multimorphemic compound word consisting yo, yā and ri. Each morpheme carries different meanings and significance. In Tangkhul Naga language, yo is a bound morpheme and carries two meanings. Firstly, it usually is associated with the serenity and vitality[iv] of the spring season. Such is the reverence that it is widely reflected in the names of persons, such as Mayori (as serene as the spring season), Mayowon (spring flower), etc., for females, and Mayongam (as poised as the spring season), Mayoshang (as rich as the spring season), etc., for males. In the Tangkhul Naga calendar, spring seaon (Mayo kachāng) is considered the season of renewal, rebirth, joy, youth, love, new life, vitality, romance and fresh energy. Secondly, yo also means the shoots and buds of plants, and carries the symbolic meaning of freshness, the top of a height and vitality of shoots or budding plants.

Yā is a bound morpheme used as a suffix with positive connotations and meanings. Yā carries five meanings. Firstly, yā means to agree, to be in agreement with and to consent. For instance, ila mayāya (I do/too agree), khamayā maleila masāpaimana (without consent, [it] cannot be done). Secondly, yā also means to multiply and spread in numbers. For instance, Kaphungkha pamshanglu. Kaphungkha pamtālu. Mi mayāmeilo[v]! (May your offspring spread an uphill and a downhill!). Thirdly, yā also signifies success, victory and triumph. For instance, maikhayā samphang haira (success, victory and triumph received [achieved]). Fourthly, yā also stands for honour and reputation. For instance, khayā kakā otna (a thing of honour and/or noble repute), khayā kālāka (very honourable and noble). Note here that yā in the sense of success, victory and triumph is more immediate and concrete, whereas yā in the sense of honour and reputation is more abstract, mediative and reflective. Fifthly, yā also symbolises poise, equability and equanimity. For instance, yā is nominalised or suffixed as leiyāsor, leikhayā, etc. Leiyāsor is the word for ‘to live joyfully and happily in abundance’. Leikhayā is the word for ‘poised, equability, happiness, joy, glory, etc’.

Ri carries three meanings, broadly. Firstly, ri means before, precede. In this context, ri is usually nominalised and/or prefixed. For instance, rimeida zatlu (go/walk before/ahead [of someone else]). Secondly, ri also means serene, peace, tranquillity, relief, repose, calm, equanimity, equability, etc. Thirdly, as a bound morpheme, ri is usually suffixed, such as masi riri phanli, ngahuiri, chingri, ning tāri haira, tāri eina/tārieina, mayori, etc. Ri is also commonly adverbialised, intensified and/or modified; for instance, masi riri phanli (the wind is blowing serenely, breezily). Ngahuiri means ‘like the demure divinity of wilted leaves that get rejuvenated and renewed when exposed to dew drops’, symbolising decorous, demure and gracious gentleness.

Chingri stands for peace and serene silence. It is interesting to note here that chingri is used synonymously for peace and serene silence. In the Tangkhul Naga language and grammar, there are several cases of homonyms and homographs. However, in the case of chingri, the probability of peace and serene silence as synonyms, strictly from a Tangkhul Naga perspective, is higher than being homonyms or homographs[vi]. Ning tāri haira means the ‘mind is in peace/tranquillity’, usually expressed as a sigh of relief or an as-good-as-soul-deep catharsis. Tāri eina is the word for deep depuration arising from satisfactory accomplishment of a task, fulfilment of a wish and so forth. An unspoken sense of gratitude always accompanies the word tāri. Mayori means ‘as serene and vitalistic as the spring season’, symbolising what serenity and vitality of the fresh budding shoots and melodious chirpings of birds in the spring season could do. Notice here the embedded axiological values that constitute and express the larger cultural ethos.

Etymologically, thus, the Tangkhul Naga concept of yoyāri constitutes the concept of well-being or vice versa. From a philosophy of mind point of view, often overlapping with psychology, cognitive science and affective science, yoyāri is a state of consciousness where the elements of affect are incorporated and instilled by the altruistic and communitarian culture. It is a culture that provides a secure ecosystem where the amygdala, hippocampus and prefrontal cortex interact optimally[vii]. The emotional brain[viii] is considered equally important as the thinking brain[ix] and, thus, neither is prioritised over the other; unlike in the West, where the thinking brain is prioritised only to entangle itself in a rational fool’s trap for various reasons, known and unknown to mankind. Yoyāri is a cognitive state of equanimity and an emotive state of compassion in a continuum, which Bodhi calls an ‘equanimity-compassion continuum’ (2020, 2022), which reflects the cognitive and emotive state and expression of mind and self.

Yoyāri as a consciousness is constitutive of the self-consciousness and social consciousness embedded in the Ao Naga principle of sobaliba, the Mizo principle of tlawmngaihna and the African philosophy of ubuntu. Ao Naga community is governed and sustained as a community by a socio-ethical principle that forces a person to deny oneself or one’s own wishes for the sake of the community for responsible and harmonious living called sobaliba (Jimomi, 2019; McFayden, 2014). Sobaliba ‘is rather a personal communion in which each member, in the midst of diversity, works for the common good’ (Shimray, 2014: 219); ‘extending help to the poor and needy…respect for elders and parents, selflessness, truthfulness, self-control, integrity and obedience, being hospitable…frugality… sustainable use of resources, sociable and so forth’ (Longchar, 1995: 126-130, cited in Shimray, 2014: 219). The Mizo principle of tlawmngaihna is one that ‘grew out of dynamic interaction of relational forces within the community-based society of the Mizos’ (Vanlalchhuanawma, 2007: 56). It is ‘to be self-sacrificing, unselfish, self-denying, persevering, stoical, stout-hearted, plucky, brave, firm, independent, loath to lose one’s good reputation, prestige, too proud or self-respecting to give in, etc.’ (Lorrain, 1940: 513, as cited in Lalnuntluangi, 2023: 7). The African philosophy of ubuntu expounds that ‘a person is only a person through other persons’ (Etieyibo, 2017); ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore, I am’ (Mbiti, 1970: 141). These principles and virtues of sobaliba, tlawmngaihna and ubuntu, though with their own context-specific differences and variations, share commonality in the foundational philosophy of knowing and doing altruism and cognising, recognising and ‘re-cognising’ (a term borrowed from Bodhi SR) the intersubjectivity.

The communal culture and communitarian etiquette assist in inculcating and embodying this foundational philosophy of altruism consciously and unconsciously with a greater degree of consideration of intersubjectivity accruing to yoyāri, a higher-order consciousness; like phenomenal consciousness navigates subtly underneath, it also provides access-consciousness for the effective ‘reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action’ (Block, 1995: 227) and affective considerations. The next section attempts to explore the Tangkhul Naga mind and self.

Tangkhul Naga mind and self

Gregory Cajete asserts that an Indigenous person is an ‘ecological person’, ‘a contemporary version of Indigenous man and woman’ (Cajete, 2000: 62). Cajete draws this idea from the Polish philosopher, Henryk Skolimowski. Skolimowski posits that an ecological person is a creature of evolution who does not believe in the philosophies of despair that are embedded in technological rationality and civilization but believe in the philosophy of hope that celebrates life “in a deep, almost metaphysical awareness of the wonderfully complex and mysterious nature of life” (1992: 112-138). Skolimowski’s ecological person is also similar to Nasr’s (1989) pontifical man[x]. ‘Nasr understands [pontifical man as] a traditional, spiritual, and religious human’ (Sayem, 2019: 286). The eco-philosophy of Skolimowski and Nasr shares many commonalities in advocating for spirituality and ecological humanism, and against the mechanistic worldview of contemporary philosophy, such as logical positivism and analytic philosophy. However, there is a fundamental difference between the two. Skolimowski believes in the evolution of man, nature and the cosmos, while Nasr believes in the permanence and immutability of man and the universe. Nasr argues that owing to the severance of reason from the permanence of intellect and revelation, ‘all permanence is reduced to becoming’ (1989: 37), while Cajete draws from ‘the tenets of native [Indigenous] philosophy’ (2000).

Likewise, given the eco-philosophy of sustainability embedded in the traditional Tangkhul Naga worldview, culture, customary practices, traditional knowledge, the doctrine of propitiation and deep reverence for nature in the everyday practice, this article claims that a pre-Colonial Tangkhul Naga person is an ecological person. From a Tangkhul Naga perspective, a Tangkhul Naga person, as an Indigenous ecological person living in a communitarian pre-state village republic that relied on oral communication technology, has a situated, encumbered and altruistic self, and a listening and dialogic mind. The orality of communication technology necessitated the inculcation of a listening mind lest the humility to listen not be as scarce as today. This works best in a culture and lifeworld where the ‘power over’[xi] is discouraged. This precludes negative attitudes and oppositional behaviour, I come back to this later, but ignites and inculcates cooperative, contributory, thoughtful and altruistic virtues. Notice here the accompanying dialogical mind to the listening mind, and the complementarity of the two.

In a communitarian pre-state village republic that is genealogically, existentially and metaphysically rooted in the land, a Tangkhul Naga person is one with a situated self; one such instance of a spiritual and metaphysical understanding is the cultural practice of burial of the umbilical cord and placenta by the pillar of the homestead at the time of birth[xii]; and a person is also buried where their umbilical cord is buried, which is one’s place of birth (Luikham, 2013: 55; Kapai, 2017: 39), which is (usually) one’s village. ‘The belief that one had to be buried in one’s birthplace is drawn from a “habit” of an animal: a porcupine is believed to crawl back to its burrow no matter how fatally it is wounded’ (Kapai, 2017: 39; Luikham, 2013: 54). One who is not buried in one’s place of birth cannot be accompanied to kazeiram (Luikham, 2013: 54, emphasis mine). Kazeiram is the land of the dead in the Tangkhul Naga eschatology. One who cannot be accompanied travels alone to kazeiram, which was believed to be lacking in honour and thus shameful and not coveted. As a communitarian society where altruism is practised, exalted and aestheticised through the principle of ‘the axiology of giving back to the community’ (Mayirnao & Khayi, 2022: 270), a Tangkhul Naga person is considered to be an encumbered self; ‘a self that is constitutive of the ends’ and ‘a self that is constitutive of the community’ (Sandel, 1982; Kymlicka, 2002). It is also an altruistic self. From a Tangkhul Naga perspective, altruism is inclusive of both other-regarding and nature-regarding, unlike the human-centric understanding of contemporary altruism as fellow-regarding. Other-regarding altruism is inculcated by the sociocultural settings of the communitarian lifeworld; also by institutions such as Longshim, which is known as Dhumkuria among the Oraons and other Adivasis, commonly known as Morung among the Nagas and Zawlbuk among the Mizos. Nature-regarding altruism is inculcated by the ecophilosophy of revering nature and the doctrine of propitiation, among other cultural ethos, customary practices and cosmological understandings. The apogee is the enkrateic mind and self (discussed below).

Philosophical praxis of achei arei kathei

In Tangkhul Naga axiology, epistemology and philosophy, achei-arei kathei is a virtue of admirable social etiquette, mannerism, civic sense and behavioural expression of agency. Achei-arei kathei is an adjective in Tangkhul Naga language. An achei-arei kathei person possesses the consciousness (self-consciousness and social consciousness) of what to do at the appropriate and/or right time and space for the right reasons; the access-consciousness[xiii] of how to do and behave. This also means knowing what not to do at the appropriate and/or right time and space for the right reasons, which in this case are the wrong reasons that ought not to be done. One is said to be achei-arei kathei if one is observant, thoughtful, mindful and tactful of one’s actions; access-consciousness of what and when to express and withhold, which corresponds to exercising liberty and upholding integrity. One with this virtue is not arrogant, assertive, interfering or divisive but demure, self-assuring but not displayed, modest, equanimous, and caring. One with this virtue is neither cowardly nor evasive but courageous, upfront and hands-on when the situation calls. The philosophical praxis of achei-arei kathei instils and inculcates mindfulness, thoughtfulness, nurturing towards others, equanimity and kindness, a word that is losing its space and relevance in the contemporary world, literature and everyday conversation.

The philosophical praxis of achei-arei kathei is also psychological and psychoanalytical in the sense that one is trained in self-control and self-mastery over one’s mind, body, consciousness, subconsciousness, speech, actions, and senses. A person cannot be said to be achei-arei kathei if one does not possess the virtue of self-mastery and self-control. The philosophy and psychology of achei-arei kathei is the mastery of consciousness over the mind, body and self; the conscious mastery over the senses, thoughts, speeches and actions with the temporal, spatial and relational consciousness, and also the lateral and vertical consciousness in the social and political sense. In a way, it is a rational choice arrived at after weighing the pros and cons of the desire and reason, and thus a pursuit driven by rational desire or a virtue cultured and nurtured by rational desire and rational choice; not in the sense of rational choice theory as understood in economics but in the Indigenous sense of the philosophical praxis of achei-arei kathei. This philosophical praxis of achei arei kathei provides the ethical guidelines to be followed and moral virtues to be inculcated. The philosophical praxis of achei arei kathei forms a significant constituent of Tangkhul Naga philosophy and political philosophy, along with the philosophical praxis of chānhān lāhān khaung, which is covered in the next section.

Philosophical praxis of chānhān lāhān khaung

A speech usually contains a speech content (what is said), the ways of saying it (how it is said) and linguistic and paralinguistic cues. In Tangkhul Naga axiology, epistemology and philosophy, chānhān lāhān khaung, at the risk of reductivism, is a virtue of speech etiquette. ‘These spiritual ideals laid the foundation for respect, which the indigenous Nagas have for their political and social institutions; the love, respect and obedience, which the children must show to their parents and elders; the strong loyalty to oath and restraints from the perpetuation of evil within the society. Through cultural participation, children acquire the techniques of communication’ (Ngakang, 2015: 66, italics mine). Ngakang’s techniques of communication refer to speech etiquette. Chānhān lāhān khaung, as speech etiquette, is widely venerated among the Tangkhul Nagas for its embedded axiological values and philosophical depth. Among Tangkhul Nagas, the admiration for chānhān lāhān khaung is also revealed in the naming of persons (shown above). This aesthetics is also reflected in Shaiza’s work: ‘Tangkhul [Naga] language is a melodic language…So, to preserve such a language and for the younger generations to learn, I write this and have kept the title of the book as Ningshātwon (flower of enchantment/enchanting flower)’ (Shaiza, 1974: Preface).

Chānhān lāhan khaung is a skill and an art of interacting and conversing with others and/or expressing oneself. It is a skill set to be acquired and an art to be inculcated and nurtured to be a better human being; the emphasis is less on personality development, which perhaps is not emphasised or less emphasised in the pre-Colonial Tangkhul Naga lifeworld. Chānhān lāhān khaung is a revered way of conveying the speech content eloquently and politely with appropriate linguistic and paralinguistic cues. In other words, chānhān lāhān khaung is delivering ‘what is said’ (speech content) in eloquence and politeness (how it is said) with gracious, elegant and calm gestures, facial expression, mood, hand movement, choice of words, tones, etc., (linguistic and paralinguistic cues). Like the emphasis is less on personality development but on being a better human being, the emphasis here, too, is more on politeness than eloquence. Notice here the emphasis on the axiological values – the ethical aspiration to be an ideal person and/or ruichumnao (citizenship) with admirable speech etiquette and the aesthetics of admiring and inculcating a culture that admires and inculcates an ideal person and/or ruichumnao as a good and beauty.

From the perspective of the philosophy of mind, chānhān lāhān khaung is an access-consciousness of how behaviour, mindset, attitude, emotion, thoughts, memories, etc., affect one’s speech – how it says what is to be said, accompanied by linguistic and paralinguistic cues. Often overlapping with psychology, cognitive science and affective science, it also includes the ability to sense, feel and understand others’ moods, emotions, behaviour, positionalities, positions, etc. In other words, it is both self-consciousness and social-consciousness of knowing what, when, where and how to say it using the right choice of words and other (appropriate) linguistic and paralinguistic cues – note here also the ability and consciousness to express and withhold, wherein at times silence is also considered a greater virtue. ‘The collected corpus of proverbs we studied shows that while speech is considered clearly a necessity in terms of self-expression, community policy determination, and social interaction, most proverbs on speaking nevertheless emphasise the power of spoken words and ultimately counsel minimal and extremely careful speech. Silence seems to be often and poignantly granted greater value in communal life’ (Mawonthing & Basu, 2024: 50).

Then, from a cultural point of view, chānhān lāhān khaung also reveals what, why and how a particular culture conceives a certain form of speech etiquette as axiologically acceptable and revered. It also includes what, why and how a particular culture cultivates this culture of speech etiquette. This cultural point of view also reveals how an individual exists as dividuals in a communitarian sociocultural and political setting, adhering to the demands of customs, traditions, cultural ethos and social norms. From a philosophical point of view, chānhān lāhān khaung also reveals the philosophical underpinnings of culture, customs, shared norms, social mores, ethics, aesthetics and so forth; how this influences the ways it is said, what is said, the nature of the linguistic cues like the choices of words, semantic structures, and the paralinguistic cues such as gestures, facial expression, hand movements, tonality, movement of eyes, etc. It is admired and inculcated for its axiological values upon which culture, customs, worldview, traditions, philosophy, customary laws, etc., grow. In this circular movement, several engaging philosophies are embedded in the philosophical praxis of chānhān lāhān khaung.

Understanding, navigating and negotiating with the paradoxes of existence and reality

These philosophies of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung are not left at the abstract philosophy alone but practised, lived and embodied. The socio-cultural and political settings of a communitarian pre-state village republic provided a fertile environment for these philosophical praxes to grow, embody and be nurtured. The philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung are intricately interlinked and complementary. In reality, this bifurcation does not exist as loudly as put forth here. The intricate linkage and complementarity of the two constitute a significant part of the Tangkhul Naga philosophy and political philosophy. The enactment and embodiment of these two philosophical and axiological ideals help a Tangkhul Naga to understand, navigate and negotiate with the paradoxes of existence and reality and the relational causalities of the two, as a ruichumnao (citizen) and as a human being.

These philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung involve conscious expression and withholding one’s agency in the sense of exercising liberty and upholding integrity. It involves processing, evaluating, assessing, integrating, cognising, ‘re-cognising’ and interpreting various stimuli and information. The brain, nervous and motor systems coordinate with each other through neural signals to relay stimuli, information and instructions. In the process, the creature-consciousness is raised to phenomenal consciousness. Through the same cognitive processes, phenomenal consciousness is raised to access-consciousness and/or higher-order consciousness. This consciousness raises the mind and self from a listening and dialogic mind, and the situated, encumbered and altruistic self to an enkrateic mind and self: A mind and self that is regulated and influenced by the philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān kahung. As explained above, the philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung are conscious of what to say and/or do at the right time and space, correspondingly to what not to say and/or do at the given space and time, or vice versa.

‘Being conscious of what to say and/or do’ is an access-conscious of (some of) the phenomenal consciousness of the lived experience in the sense that this access-consciousness as a mental state is ‘poised for free use in reasoning and for direct “rational” control of action and speech’ (Block, 1995: 382). This access-consciousness is raised to a form of higher-order consciousness through social interactions within and/or parallel-tangential to the bounds of the culturally embedded normative ethos, though not as loudly and structurally as regulatory frameworks and institutions in other non-communitarian societies. The philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung are as spiritual as they are socially moralistic and ethically virtuous. These praxes also raise the unconscious and subconscious to the phenomenal consciousness and then to the access-consciousness. The socio-cultural, moral and epistemic virtues of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung enable raising the listening and dialogic mind, and the situated, encumbered and altruistic self to the enkrateic mind and self, which is attained at a later stage after raising the phenomenal consciousness to access-consciousness and higher-order consciousness.

The questions begging are how does this enkrateic mind and self contest, negotiate and navigate the personal/individual space and public/social space; the normative relationship of the individual with the society; the structure of the society that may take the form of sociocultural norms and ethics, not necessarily institutions, for laying the moral groundworks and foundations for inculcating the ethical principles as personal virtues; it may also take the form of political structure and institutions for governance and administration, not necessarily to the extent of enforceability. This enkrateic mind and self may not be acquired by all, but by some and across generations. The formidable culture, customs, traditions and institutions with plausible underlying ethics, norms, mores, value systems and regulatory frameworks bequeathed from generation to generation depict the workings of a certain enkrateic mind and self.

The idea of yoyāri is a state of mind and self without negative attitudes and oppositional behaviour. The philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung also subtly but effectively deal with negative attitudes and oppositional behaviour. It tactfully deals with the idea of ‘face’ and ‘losing face’. In politeness theory, ‘face is something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction’ (Brown & Levinson, 1978: 61). ‘Our notion of “face” is derived from that of Goffman (1967) and from the English folk term, which ties face up with notions of being embarrassed or humiliated, or “losing face”’ (Brown & Levinson, 1978: 61). Brown & Levinson classify face as negative face and positive face: Negative face is ‘the want of every “competent adult member” that his actions be unimpeded by others: Positive face is the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others’ (Brown & Levinson, 1988: 62). In other words, negative face is ‘the desire to be unimpeded in one’s actions’, and positive face is ‘the desire (in some respects) to be approved of’ (Brown & Levinson, 1988: 13)

The gentle and inoffensive speech etiquette embedded in the philosophical praxis of chānhān lāhān khaung unleashes the expressed (including what is said – speech content, and how it is said – style of speech including linguistic and paralinguistic cues) free from the binaric conditioning, though binaric and conditional; diffuses the didactic tonality and makes it respectful and conversational, though didactic in content and meaning. The gentle and inoffensive speech content, style of speech and linguistic and paralinguistic cues make it easier for absorption and contemplation. On the contrary, it generates positive energy of cooperation and contribution instead of the negative energy of competition, (sullen) resentment and catastrophic dismissal.

The philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung tactfully deal with ‘losing face’, precluding negative attitudes, emotional reactions and outbursts, and oppositional behaviours. One that is also explained by the classic Japanese concept of enryo: ‘The classic [Japanese] concept of enryo is described as an empathic orientation and hesitation of self-expression by minimizing frank expression, which can be seen to protect the hearer’s negative face…the new concept of enryo can be said to be similar to the concept of negative face, since both negative face and enryo can be seen as the social contract that allows rejection to be expressed indirectly to others by satisfying one’s desire to be unimpeded on an individual level’ (Takita, 2012: 194).

Psychologically, this prevents or reduces the intensity of transference and projections. Correspondingly, this enhances willingness to listen, which also means a higher tolerance level and thus absorption. This consequently enhances the virtuous circle of the optimal functions of the listening and dialogical mind. Hermeneutically, this also encourages a healthier hermeneutic circle, which complements the equanimous functions of the listening and dialogical mind, and the situated, encumbered and altruistic self; and the equanimous functions of the enkrateic mind and self, in some cases. In other words, yoyāri, living well and well-being begin in the mind and self. Yoyāri, like enkrateia, is the self-mastery over one’s mind, desire, impulses, consciousness and subconsciousness. The hedonistic, utilitarian and catastrophic hijack, akin to the amygdala hijack[xiv], arose from, more than akrasia, the inability to understand, navigate and negotiate with the paradoxes of reality and existence and the relational causalities of the two.

Understanding, navigating and negotiating with the paradoxes of reality and existence and the relational causalities of the two requires the ability to withhold and/or express one’s agency. When things are in equilibrial homeostasis, one’s agency is withheld or controlled at the permissible level and navigated with the flow of things passively. This also means three things. Firstly, it means watchfully biding the time to let the tension die out to avoid escalation and/or respond only as and when required. Secondly, this also means upholding one’s integrity, that is, exercising the will power to control one’s speech and action, gaining self-mastery. Thirdly, it also means inaction (if actions are not required), which would produce no or fewer consequences.

If the equilibrial homeostasis is disturbed, one’s agency is expressed as much as it would require to revert it back to an earlier equilibrial homeostasis or to negotiate with the flow of things within a permissible or tolerable range, which also means avoidance of displacements and extreme situations. If the situation calls for it, the expression of one’s agency may extend to the degree of active assertion: Read with Gandhi’s notion of cowardice. The implication is that the access-consciousness of the timeliness and placeliness in the expression of one’s agency, that is, the ability to exercise liberty and/or uphold integrity, plays a significant role in navigating and negotiating with the paradoxes of reality and existence and the relational causalities of the two. Notice here that a phenomenon akin to Newton’s third law of motion is being tackled tactfully: For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The mindful and mastery application of Newton’s third law of motion is the mindful and mastery expression of one’s agency, as exercising liberty and/or upholding integrity herein. In this manner, the equilibrial homeostasis is maintained and nurtured by exercising liberty and/or upholding integrity, which is culturally cultivated as etiquette and character through the philosophical praxes of achei arei kathei and chānhān lāhān khaung.

Conclusion

An epistemology of a thing ought to cohere with and correspond to its ontology. Hermeneutical dissonances reduce the hermeneutic circle of the trajectory of its conception in the sense of movement of ideas and consciousness into a vicious circle[xv]. Taking Aristotle’s idea of eudaimonia as the point of reference, the contemporary Western understanding of well-being has deviated from the meaning of Aristotle’s conception due to hermeneutical dissonances. Aristotle’s idea of eudaimonia as the ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete [virtue]’, is now interpreted and understood as human good, human flourishing and/or human emancipation. Hermeneutical dissonances cause dissonances in meaning, meaning-making, knowledge production, and other unintended consequences. The Indigenous conceptions of well-being, such as buen vivir or vivir bien in Spanish, sumak kawsay in Quechua, or suma gamaña in Aymara, as ‘living well in social solidarity and harmony with nature’, could also meet the same fate.

The assertion of this paper is that if the Indigenous conceptions of well-being had been engaging more with the extractive capitalist development in search of alternatives, these concepts would also need to strengthen their own epistemic strength, identity and agency. Likewise, this proposition of yoyāri as a concept of well-being attempts to strengthen the epistemic strength, identity and agency; strengthening the foundational philosophy of the Indigenous conceptions of well-being, living well as against only being reactionary to the waves of hermeneutical dissonances. The intent is to avoid any possible co-optation of the actuality and potentialities of the Indigenous conceptions of well-being, living well, but to encourage dialogical engagements among various epistemologies in an ‘ecology of knowledges’. The Indigenous conceptions of buen vivir or vivir bien in Spanish, sumak kawsay in Quechua, suma gamaña in Aymara, yoyāri in Tangkhul Naga and Bodhi’s principles of well-being, which include the principles of dignity, unity, co-existence, peace and harmony, no-harm and fear, economic stability, ethical lifestyle and ecological well-being (Bodhi’s lecture on Indigenous Tribal Knowledge System), are all different points of reference in a continuum or circle of the Indigenous conceptions of well-being, living well.

Endnotes

[i] “Eudaimonia happiness. Alternative translations: `flourishing’; `well-being’. A broad term, roughly equivalent to ‘whatever makes a human life good for the person living it’. Happiness must not be understood to be a contented state of mind, as in, ‘I feel happy today.’ The Greek eu means ‘well’, and daimon ‘fortune’, which accounts partly for Aristotle’s occasional readiness to use the word ‘blessedness’ (makariotes) instead of ‘happiness’ and for the discussion of the relation between happiness and fortune at the end of book 1” (Aristotle, 2004: 206, as per Roger Crisp in the translation).

[ii] In that it is a praxis, it is correspondingly methodical and methodological: The ability to know and do purposively and intentionally by virtue of being an ability knowledge, and ability knowledge too is philosophical if ‘culture’ is ‘philosophy of the first order activity’ (Mbaegbu, 2014).

[iii] A sentiment shared by a significant number of the research participants and, perhaps, strengthened after the ongoing Meitei-Kuki-Zo-Chin conflict erupted on 3^rd May 2023 in Manipur, India.

[iv] Vitality herein be understood, in terms of expanse and depth of the concept, as both Henri Bergson’s (1907) vitality as élan vital and creativity and Deleuze & Guattari’s vitality as difference, desire and becoming (2009 [1972]).

[v] ‘My maternal uncle, Tuingapām Seipainao, pronounced the same during the maternal-uncle-blessing-prayer on my wedding’, as narrated by one of the research participants, Ningam Mayirnao, who begets 7 children, a blessing fulfilled in that sense.

[vi] A decolonial dialogical historiography (sensu Bodhi, 2020, 2022) of the concept of chingri as peace, and synonymous with serene silence or vice versa, gives a sense that life in the pre-Colonial period was rather peaceful and calm, subject to further research, unlike the portrayal otherwise in colonial writings and the uncritical reproduction thereof and thereon, which are intentionally not reproduced here to erase them from the psyche, memories and literature, with the foot firm on epistemic resistance for ‘epistemological decolonisation’ and the eye on healing and well-being.

[vii] In neuroscience, as confirmed by neuroimaging studies and other methods, the interaction among the amygdala, hippocampus and prefrontal cortex is optimal in a normal and/or healthy brain, which keeps the brain, nervous system and body coherent. On exposure to and experiencing trauma/s, the interaction subsides: The amygdala and hippocampus are activated, while the prefrontal cortex is correspondingly deactivated or its activities and functions are significantly reduced (Orji & Alta, 2024; Salerian, 2015; Šimic ́ et. al., 2021; Song, 2023)

[viii] The emotional brain includes the limbic system and reptilian parts of the brain.

[ix] The thinking brain includes the cortex, frontal cortex and prefrontal cortex in the cerebrum.

[x] For Nasr, a pontifical man is a traditional man who lives in full awareness of the spiritual reality in the origin and centre. The origin contains its perfection and perfectibility, where the ‘primordial purity and wholeness’ is required to ‘emulate, recapture and transmit’. A pontifical man revolves around a circle, whose centre is sought to reach in life, thought and actions. Such a man is ‘the reflection of the center on the periphery’, who has a nostalgia for the centre that is sacred and eternal. ‘His actions have an effect upon his own being beyond the limited spatio-temporal conditions in which such actions take place’ (Nasr, 1989: 145).

[xi] On typologies of power, “power over” is a toxic form of power that belongs exclusively to dominant groups and powerful institutions in a zero-sum equation. ‘Power within’ is the power ‘which can grow in a person as they gain self-belief and an understanding of their rights’; ‘power with’ as the power ‘when collectives come together to exercise joint action and solidarity’; and ‘power to’ as ‘the ability to decide actions and carry them out’ (O’Brien, 2020; Rowlands, 1997).

[xii] As narrated by Punreila Mayirnao, a sexagenarian research participant, on 3^rd August 2022. Also, medical terms clarified by Dr. Leiyami Kasar, General Physician at St. Stephen’s Hospital, New Delhi, on 22^nd July 2022.

[xiii] Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action’ (Block, 1995: 227). ‘Later in the same article, Block confirmed his view that A-Cs [Access-Consciousness] is required for reasoning, reporting and enabling rational control of action’ (Naccache, 2018: 1). “‘Phenomenal Consciousness’ as a much richer subjective experience that is not accessed but that would still delineate the extent of consciousness” (Naccache, 2018: 1). Access-consciousness is ‘a state’s capacity for rational control of speech and/or behavior’ (Goldman, 1997: 113).

[xiv] Amygdala hijack is ‘where the amygdala, a key brain structure involved in emotional processing, overrides rational thinking during intense emotional experiences’ (Orji & Ita, 2024: 102). ‘In certain situations, the amygdala can become hijacked, leading to intense emotional reactions that override rational thinking, a phenomenon known as Amygdala Hijack. This response is part of the fight-or-flight reaction to stress, where the amygdala triggers these responses without any conscious initiation from the individual…When the amygdala senses danger, it signals the brain to release stress hormones, preparing the body to either fight or flee from the threat…amygdala hijack can disrupt the normal functioning of the prefrontal cortex, leading to impulsive and suboptimal decision-making’ (ibid: 103).

[xv] Note here the concerns on the hermeneutic circle vis-à-vis vicious circle shared by Heidegger (2008: 194-195) and Gadamer (1979:148-149).

References

• Aristotle. 2004. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and edited by Roger Crisp. Cambridge University Press.
• Bergson, Henri. 1907. Creative Evolution. Translated by Donald A Landes. Routledge.
• Block, Ned. 1995. “On a Confusion About the Role of Consciousness”. Behavioural and Brain Science, 18:  227 – 287. Doi:10.1017/S0140525X00038188)
• Bodhi, SR. 2020. Epistemology of the Peripheralized: A Decolonial-Historical Approach. Tribal Intellectual Collective India. Nagpur: New Vehicle Productions.
• Bodhi, SR. 2022. “The Decolonial-Historical Approach in Social Research: Its Methodological Contours”. Journal of Tribal Intellectual Collective India. Vol. 6 (2): 1-12.
• Brown, Penelope & Levinson, Stephen C. 1988. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Cajete, Gregory. 2000. Native Science: Natural Laws of Interdependence. Santa Fe, New Mexico: Clear Light Publishers.
• Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Felix. 2009. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Penguin Classics.
• Etieyibo, Edwin. 2017. “Ubuntu, Cosmopolitanism, and Distribution of Natural Resources”. Philosophical Papers, 46 (1), 139-162. DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2017.1295616
• Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Chapter Three. The Problem of Historical Consciousness”. In Interpretive Social Science: A Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, 103-160. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520340343-005
• Goldman, Alvin I. 1997. “Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science”. In The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Giizeldere, Pp. 111-126. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press.
• Gudynas, Eduardo. 2011. “Buen Vivir: Today’s tomorrow”. Development, 54(4): 441–447. Doi:10.1057/dev.2011.86.
• Heidegger, Martin. 2008. Being and Time. Harper Perennial Modern Thought.
• Hutton, JH. “The Mixed Culture of the Naga Tribes”. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 95 (1965): 16-43.
• Jimomi, VN. 2019. “The Concept of Sobaliba – From the Outside Looking In”. The Nagaland Post, May 3. https://www.nagalandpost.com/index.php/the-concept-of-sobaliba-from-the-outside-looking-in/ (Accessed August 29, 2022).
• Kapai, Yuimirin. 2017. “Framing Social Transition of the Tangkhul Nagas: Disembedding Mechanisms and Oral Culture”. Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 24 (2): 37-54.
• Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
• Lalnuntluangi. 2023. “Theologizing Tlawmngaihna in Mizo Culture for National Integrity”. Heritage Research Journal, ISSN No: 0474-9030, 71 (8): 6-15.
• Lorrain, JH. 1940. Dictionary of the Lushai Language. Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.
• Luikham, Thisan. 1974. Tangkhul (Wung) Dictionary: Tangkhul-Tangkhul-English. Self-published.
• Luikham, Thisan. 2013. Wung (Tangkhul) Naga Okthot Mayonzā (Wung Tangkhul Naga Traditional Laws). Ukhrul: Kachingmi Ragui.
• Mawonthing NG & Basu, Debapriya. 2024. “’Animals are Killed by their Spoor and Men by Their Words’: The Rhetoric of Speech and Silence in Phalee Proverbs”. Proverbium, 41: 50-72.
• Mayirnao, Shaokhai & Khayi, Sinalei. 2022. “Decolonising Feasts of Merit: Reasoning Marān Kasā from a Tangkhul Naga Perspective”. Asian Ethnicity, 24(2): 258-277. DOI: 10.1080/14631369.2022.2089093.
• Mbaegbu, Celestine C. 2014. Culture as Philosophy of the First Order Activity. Open Journal of Philosophy, 4, 492-501.
• Mbiti, John. 1970. African Religions and Philosophies. New York: Doubleday.
• McFayden, Narola Ao. 2014. “Reclaiming Sobaliba: The Vital Role of Culturally Relevant Moral Education to Counter Increasing Patterns of Violence against Women”. Annual Meeting, Nov 7-9. Union Presbyterian Seminary. https://religiouseducation.net/rea2014/files/2014/07/RIG-McFayden-Narola.pdf
• Munck, Ronaldo. 2024. Coloniality of Power and Progressive Politics in Latin America: Development, Indigenous Politics and Buen Vivir. Springer.
• Naccache, Lionel. 2018. “Why and How Access Consciousness Can Account For Phenomenal Consciousness”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 373: 20170357: 1-9.
• Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1989. Knowledge and the Sacred. Albany: State University of New York Press.
• Ngakang, Tuisem. 2015. “Traditional Knowledge, Socio-Cultural Practices and Modern Education”. In Rethinking Education in the Hills of Northeast India, edited by AS Yaruingam & AC Kharingpam, 64-75. New Delhi: Shipra Publications.
• Orji, Leonard C & Alta, Umoh A. 2024. “Amygdala Hijack: Contemporary Insights into Causes, Correlates and Consequences”. African Journal of Health, Nursing and Midwifery, 7 (3): 102-111.
• O’Brien, Paul. 2020. “Left Behind or Pushed Behind? Redistributing Power Over the Sustainable Development Goals”. In: Homi Kharas, John W. McArthur & Izumi Ohno (eds) Leave No One Behind: Time for Specifics on the Sustainable Development Goals. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
• Petras, James. 2021. “Extractive Capitalism: Development and Resistance Dynamics”. In Buen Vivir and the Challenges to Capitalism in Latin America, edited by Henry Veltmeyer & Edgar Záyago-Lau, 31-49. London & New York: Routledge.
• Rowlands, Jo. 1997. “Questioning Empowerment: Working with Women in Honduras.”. UK & Ireland: Oxfam.
• Sandel, Michael. 1982. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Salerian, Alen. J. “Prefrontal Cortex Governs Normalcy and Psychiatric Illness: Neuroimaging Evidence”. Journal of Psychology & Clinical Psychiatry, 3 (2): 000125 (2015). DOI: 10.15406/jpcpy.2015.03.00125.
• Sayem, Md. Abu. “The Eco-Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr: Spiritual Crisis and Environmental Degradation”. Islamic Studies 58:2 (2019) pp. 271–295
• Shaiza, Kanrei. 1974. Ningshatwon. Ukhrul: Self-published.
• Shimray, Shimreingam L. 2014. “Theological Response to Human Rights Discourse in Tangkhul Culture”. In: Encountering Modernity: Situating the Tangkhul Nagas in Perspectives, edited by R Vashum, AS Yaruingam, AS Shimreiwung, Yuimirin Kapai, 217-226. Delhi: Chicken Neck.
• Šimic ́, Goran, Mladenka Tkalcˇic ́, Vana Vukic ́, Damir Mulc, Ena Španic ́, Marina Šagud, Francisco E. Olucha-Bordonau, Mario Vukšic ́ & Patrick R. Hof. “Understanding Emotions: Origins and Roles of the Amygdala”. Biomolecules, 11 (823), 2021. https://doi.org/10.3390/ biom11060823.
• Skolimowski, Henryk. 1992. Living Philosophy: Eco-philosophy as a Tree of Life. Arkana Books.
• Song, Juhyun. 2023. “Amygdala Activity and Amygdala-Hippocampus Connectivity: Metabolic Diseases, Dementia, and Neuropsychiatric Issues”. Biomedicine and Pharmacotherapy, 162(2023) 114647: 1-14.
• Takita, Fuyuko. 2012. “Rethinking the Concept of Negative Politeness ‘Enryo’ in Japan”. Hiroshima Studies in Language and Language Education, 15: 189–195. Doi:
  https://doi.org/10.15027/32304.
• Vanlalchhuanawma. 2007. Christianity and Subaltern Culture: Revival Movement as a Cultural Response to Westernisation in Mizoram. Delhi: ISPCK Publisher.
• Vashum, Reisang. 2014. “Terrains of Tangkhul Society: An Overview”. In Encountering Modernity: Situating the Tangkhul Nagas in Perspectives, edited by R. Vashum, AS Yaruingam, AS Shimreiwung & Yuimirin Kapai, 9-27. New Delhi: Chicken Neck.
• Veltmeyer, Henry & Záyago-Lau, Edgar. 2021. “Introduction”. In Buen Vivir and the Challenges to Capitalism in Latin America, edited by Henry Veltmeyer & Edgar Záyago-Lau, 1-10. London & New York: Routledge.
• Wise, Raúl Delgado. 2021. “Capitalism on the Frontier of Agroextractivism”. In Buen Vivir and the Challenges to Capitalism in Latin America, edited by Henry Veltmeyer & Edgar Záyago-Lau, 50-70. London & New York: Routledge.

 

Shaokhai Mayirnao is PhD Scholar, School of Development Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India.

 

Have you like this article?